In this paper, we introduce a novel security protocol for wireless network of sensors. The new security mechanism is efficient, flexible, and very amenable for deployment in the resource constrained sensor networks. Our cryptosystem is a simple and fast stream cipher that utilizes permutation vectors as encryption keys, forcing an intruder to a brute-force time complexity of Ω(2 n ). In addition, our mechanism alleviates the effect of sensor capture, via its re-keying feature. It also utilizes the group deployment of newly joining sensors in order to reduce the overall energy consumption. Extensive experimental results indicate that the performance of our system excels over other state-of-the-art peer modern crypto systems (AES, DES, TripleDES), especially in the power budget arena.
In this paper, we will investigate the deployment of our proposed security model, Synchronous Dynamic Encryption System (SDES), for sensor networks. Section 2 describes the constraints and limitations that generally characterize sensors networks. The first approach of solving the secret key distribution problem is depicted in Section 3. Section 4 explains the necessity of utilizing symmetric key cryptography for better power consumption efficiency. The advantages of stream ciphers and their easy deployment in sensor networks are stated in Section 5. Our SDES is presented in Section 6, with full details on permutation vector generation, encryption/decryption functions and secret key management. A comparison between our security model and other peer models is presented in Section 7. Section 8 is our conclusion.
SENSOR NETWORKS CONSTRAINTS
The major three inherent constraints of typical network of sensors are namely i) its ad-hoc nature, ii) the low budget of the sensing devices that reflects on its storage, computational, transmission reach, and power capabilities. We will discuss the limitations imposed by such inherent properties and their influence on the installed security primitives.
Limited memory space
In large-scale sensor networks, thousands of nodes, it is nearly impossible for every sensor to store a shared key with every other communicating sensor in the network, as it requires large memory that is not available in the sensor. Therefore, current key establishment schemes are not quite feasible. In addition, installed security primitives have to be simple and optimized in order to fit in the sensor tiny memory. The memory size limitation also affects the storage of a-priori knowledge of all possible nodes that will join the network.
Limited power
Any deployed security mechanism has to minimize computation and transmission overheads in order to utilize the sensor's battery efficiently. Complicated encryption techniques (e.g. public key algorithms) and high-challenging authentication mechanisms are usually avoided in any sensor security scheme, due to power limitations.
Limited budget
Sensors are an order of magnitude lesser in price than personal computers (few dollars). Unattended sensors are highly vulnerable to be captured by intruders. A captured sensor might reveal essential info about the deployed security mechanism. Hence, we have to consider such attacks while designing sensor security mechanism in order to limit their effect in the overall integrity and performance of the network
PUBLIC KEY BASED SECURITY
Public key cryptosystems are suitable for networks of decentralized architecture. In sensor networks, due to the huge overhead of involving a central authority, adjacent sensors mutually authenticate without the need to deploy a third party. Thus, the use of Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) is most amenable for use in decentralized sensor networks and would eliminate the centralized authority problem [10] . Because of its asymmetry property, sensors do not need to carry the predistributed keys. It should be clear that an intrusion on one sensor will not affect the security of others.
The most common criticism on using PKC in sensor networks is its computational complexity and communication overhead [10] . Recently, a number of studies have been conducted to evaluate the practicality of using PKC in sensor networks [3] [2] . Their results show that PKC is indeed feasible to be used in sensor networks. For example, Gura et al. [7] show that Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) signature verification takes 1.62s with 160-bit keys on ATmega128 8MHz processor, a processor used for Crossbow motes platform.
Du et. al. developed a tree-based key-authentication scheme in order to minimize the PKC authentication overhead [10] . They modified the model of Merkle trees that was proposed by Merkle in 1980 [8] . The Merkle tree is basically a complete binary tree that has all sensors' public keys as its leaves. Then, every parent node in the Merkle tree is the result of a hash function of its left and right children. Therefore, there is a unique path between a sensor's public key and the root (pk, hl-1, hl-2, …, h1), where pk is the sensor's public key, hi is the hash value of path node of level i, and l is the tree height. Every sensor that wants to authenticate itself has to save the corresponding tree path in its memory. On the other hand, every sensor that wants to certify other sensors' keys needs to save the root of the Merkle tree only.
Du et. al. exploited the sensors deployment knowledge to reduce the height of the Merkle tree. In fact, they suggested the use of multiple trees, where shorter trees gather adjacent sensors' public keys, and larger trees are a collection of shorter sub-trees. The large trees serve to authenticate sensors that are not adjacent; the farther the communicating sensors, the larger tree they belong to. The main disadvantage of the modified Merkle scheme is the network scalability. In fact, adding a single node will affect the hash value at the root, and therefore, the entire network needs to be notified, wasting communication bandwidth and transmission power.
SYMMETRIC KEY BASED SECURITY
Even though the public key based authentication solves the problematic key-distribution process and secures sensor scalability, Eschenauer and Gligor argued against it [4] due to its tremendous computational overhead. Instead, they proposed a basic-scheme for random symmetric key pre-distribution [4] . They suggest that a pool of S keys is generated by a central authority, where only m keys are to be chosen (randomly) by each sensor. When the sensors are deployed, each node consults with its neighbors for a possible shared key among the m key stored in its memory. Eschenauer and Gligor assert that two sensors could share a key with probability p. If we consider a graph of all nodes where each edge represents a shared key between two adjacent sensors, the value of p is chosen so that the graph is connected; there exists a path between any two nodes in the network. Therefore, if two adjacent sensors do not share a key, a secret key is generated and transmitted through the connecting secure path. However, it is still unobvious how to choose the optimal values of S, m, and p. When m is small, adjacent sensors are not likely to share secret keys, and therefore, additional key regenerations are needed which reduces the sensor lifetime due to the additional transmission and computational overhead. On the other hand, a larger m exposes the network to fast compromise when a node is captured, in addition to the large space needed to store the keys.
TOWARDS DYNAMIC SECURITY: EFFICIENCY OF STREAM CIPHERS
Karlof et. al. designed a chain-block-cipher (CBC) security mechanism called TinySec [1] , and argued why CBC is the most appropriate encryption scheme for sensor networks. Symmetric key encryption schemes generally fall into two categories: stream ciphers and modes of operation using block ciphers. The fastest stream ciphers are faster than the fastest block ciphers, which might make them more appealing in a resource-constrained environment. One kind of stream ciphers is the initialization vector (IV) based stream cipher, where both the secret key K and IV are used as a seed for pseudorandom encryption keystream generation, GK(IV). The keystream is then XORed against the plain message P: C = (IV;GK(IV ) ⊕ P). However, IV-based stream ciphers have a devastating failure mode: if the same IV is ever used to encrypt two different packets, then it is often possible to recover both plaintexts. So, another alternative is to use a mode of operation based on a block cipher [9] . The CBC is provably secure when IVs do not repeat [5] . On the other hand, CBC leaks only a small amount of information in the presence of repeated IVs, a significant improvement over a IV-based stream cipher [1] . It is known to suffer some leakage when used with counter generated IVs, yet it is best used with random generation of IVs [1] .
TinySec uses a cipher block chaining construction, CBC-MAC [6] , for computing and verifying MACs. CBC-MAC is efficient and fast, and the fact that it relies on a block cipher as well minimizes the number of implemented cryptographic primitives in the limited size sensor memory. CBC-MAC is provably secure [6] , however the standard CBC-MAC construction is not secure for variably sized messages. Bellare, Kilian, and Rogaway suggest three alternatives for generating MACs for variable sized messages [6] .
SYNCHRONOUS DYNAMIC ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
Due to the restrictions imposed on sensors networks, our major objective in designing a new security model is to minimize costeffect of the following: network intrusion, when a sensor is captured. communication overhead, in case of revoking a shared secret key, especially the keys stored at the captured sensor. computation overhead, in securing the network, in order to save sensor's lifetime. utilized key space.
Our Synchronous Dynamic Encryption System (SDES) is a stream cipher crypto system based on permutation vector generation. SDES that avoids the usage of an IV, due to its security loopholes, previously mentioned. Upon key agreement, the two communicating sensors use the shared key K in any future invocation of security primitives, e.g., communication confidentiality, sensor authentication, and message integrity. We will adopt the basic-scheme of random key pre-distribution proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [4] , since key agreement methods are out of the scope of this paper. Yet, we will also utilize the PKC in the case the sensor fails to authenticate itself to the network. For instance, when a new sensor joins the network, it is preferable to perform a certification of its public key rather than jeopardizing the entire network security using the symmetric key approach. We will elaborate further on the authentication process, later in the paper.
SDES is a stream cipher that generates a stream of permutation vectors. Each permutation vector of size n is combination of byte cells, each with value that ranges between 0 and n-1, without repetition. These permutation vectors are used to encrypt plain messages, one at a time. In order to simplify the key management procedure, SDES uses the secret key K in the key management process in order to permute the current encryption key, permutation vector, to produce the next permutation vector or encryption.
The generation of encrypting permutation vectors keys can be performed recursively. Given a permutation vector PV, the generation of the next permutation vector PV` = Permutation (PV, K) is performed as follows:
Given the initial permutation vector is (0, 1, …, n-1) , each node can generate a list of permutation vector that can be used in future encryption. This is possible only if the secret key K is static. However, for security purposes, we prefer that the secret key will be modified as the encryption key is regenerated.
Encryption/decryption and re-keying functions
The encryption function is simplified in order to minimize the computational overhead, saving sensor's battery power. Thus, a simple XOR is performed between the data record di and a generated permutation vectors PVi, resulting in a cipher ci, to be transmitted. The decryption function, at the receiving sensor, is performed in the same manner of the encryption function, at the source sensor. The cipher record ci is XORed with the same permutation vector PVi (generated at the recipient side) producing the original data record di. As part of the full sourcedestination secret key synchronization (hence the name SDES), both communication parties generate the same new permutation vector (PVi+1), based on the same previously generated secrete K, to be used in the next encryption/decryption operations. The next step is the source-destination synchronized re-keying process. As we discussed earlier, SDES alters the secret key for solid network security. Our SDES is novel; it distinguishes itself from other peer techniques by involving both the encryption key PVi and the data di in the secret key re-keying function as follows: Ki+1 ← ( Ki + PVi + di ) modulo n, where Ki+1 and Ki are the respective current and the next secret key values.
There are three major advantages of our re-keying approach. Firstly, since PVi is very diverse, the generated secret key will be robust, avoiding poor-key attacks. Moreover, the overall network security is increased due the natural diversity of transmitted data between different communication links.
The second advantage of SDES re-keying over other peer mechanisms is that all past communicated information is safe, prior to compromising any secret key instance. Assuming that an attacker succeeds in capturing a sensor at the i th communication phase, he/she will compromise any data that is stored in the sensor's memory. Therefore, all secret information Ki, PVi and di are compromised, in addition to any cipher (c1, c2, …, ci) that the attacker may record while eavesdropping on the communication channel. Since the sensor may share the same set of initial m keys that was described in the basic-scheme of random key distribution, the attacker needs to perform backward tracking to get the initial key K1, which is so critical since it is the only key that could be temporarily shared by a group of sensors. Because the secret information at the (i-1) th phase (Ki-1, PVi-1 and di-1) is overwritten, the attacker has to solve these equations in order to restore them back:
where ReversePermutation() is the reverse function of Permutation(). However, any attempt to solve the previous equations via variable substitution process will lead to circular referencing; i.e., Ki-1, PVi-1, and di-1 in function of Ki-1, PVi-1, and di-1, respectively. Moreover, we have proved mathematically (out of the scope of this paper) that at least 2 n-1 different values for Ki-1 will permute PVi-1 to PVi. Therefore, the backward tracking to get up to K1 is as hard as brute-forcing a key space of Ω(2 n-1 ) size complexity. For considerably large values of n, the proposed model guarantees minimal security damage upon sensor capturing; jeopardizing the corresponding communication links of the captured node. However, the proposed model still relies on the fact that sensors are not likely to be captured at the beginning of the network deployment.
The third advantage of our re-keying method is the reduction of key revocation effect. When a malicious node is detected, other peer mechanisms need to broadcast the entire set of keys corresponding to the malicious node. They also encounter an additional overhead of key re-establishment for all revoked keys. In our system, only the malicious node id is to be broadcasted to the entire network in order to start the process of its isolation.
Sensors authentication
After establishing a secret key based on the basic-scheme, any two communicating sensors have to start a mutual authentication procedure as follows. The source sensor sends a connection request to the destination with two challenges c1 and c2. The challenges quantities c1 and c2 are the encryption of the same chosen nonce N with two consecutive permutation vectors, which are generated based on the shared key K. The authentication process starts by obtaining the decrypted values of c1 and c2 and comparing them for equality. If they are equal, the recipient node encrypts the same nonce with the next permutation vector, in sequence, and sends the resulting cipher c3 back to the source sensor. The mutual authentication ends successfully when the source sensor decrypts c3 and verifies the equality with the originally transmitted N.
New sensors deployment might be due to either the need to expand an existing network (say group G1) to cover adjacent regions, or recover from a bad distribution of sensors in a previous deployment. Other peer mechanisms consider only individual node deployment, since a newly joining node might share several keys with the network. However, it is no the case in our system, since all keys are dynamic. Therefore, we implemented the deployment of new sensors in groups instead of individuals.
We will follow the same basic-scheme key agreement and the above SDES authentication mechanisms in order to establish secure connection between sensors of the newly joining group G2. In order to join G1 and G2, their touching edge sensors authenticate via the PKC, only once in their lifetime, saving much needed sensor energy. Then, based on the basic-scheme in Section 4, the process of neighborhood adjustment with secret key establishment will be accomplished among adjacent sensors of G1 and G2.
Additional efficiency through flexible integrity checking process
The SDES introduces a much more flexible and powerful message integrity mechanism replacing the checksum-like mechanisms. Since secret key generation depends on data, integrity violations are detected via key mis-synchronization. Our system divides each session into sections of size R+1 records, with R data records and a duplicate of the last record. The receiver validates the integrity of the entire section by simply verifying the equality of the last two received data records, ignoring the duplicate record. If an integrity violation is detected, the sender needs to encrypt and retransmit the previous R+1 data records, which may degrade the performance of our mechanism in hostile environments. An advantage of our mechanism is the flexibility of adjusting R based on the environment hostility.
Hence, the communication throughput is R/(R+1), whereas the efficiency of other mechanisms that utilize CRC is about 80% (e.g., in 128-block ciphers, using 32-bit CRC field). Moreover, the CRC detects only cipher alteration, whereas our mechanism has the huge advantage of detecting many more violations, such as cipher shuffling, injection, and deletion and session hijacking.
Comparison with peer techniques
In terms of power consumption, our SDES mechanism is the lowest among all due to the simplicity of stream ciphers, as shown in the next section. Moreover, the flexibility of SDES saves more energy, when the need for integrity protection rises, than other listed techniques. In terms of memory storage, SDES utilizes only the available space of the sensor's memory.
Scalability is also a very important factor in sensor networks since there will be always a need to replace expired/damaged sensors, increase the network diameter, populate sparsely distributed regions in the network. PCK techniques excel in the simplicity of their scalability, which led us to incorporate their approach temporarily in our system. Since our mechanism adopt a group sensor deployment, only edge nodes need to be PCK authenticated to the network. However, for other nodes, we use the simpler basic-scheme establishment. Hence, our hybrid scalability is more effective than that of the PCK in terms of computation and communication overheads, which saves energy. Another advantage of SDES's scalability over that of the basicscheme is the balancing of power consumption over the network. In the latter, a key path has to be established through the network if a new joining sensor does not share keys with its neighbors. This could lead to imbalanced power consumption at nodes that are part of multi-paths. On the contrary, the SDES scalability guarantees the path key establishment only within the newly joining group, decreasing the possibility of multiple shared paths per node, hence alleviating the above problem.
The impact of capturing (intruding) a node varies from one security mechanism to another. Since our SDES mechanism applies re-keying to all sensors stored keys upon the first communication, any sensor capture will jeopardize its corresponding communication links only. Hence, our SDES mechanism achieves the same best security of the PCK.
In case of detecting an intruded sensor, an efficient method is needed to isolate it from the network. Our mechanism saves communication bandwidth and energy since only the malicious node's id is broadcasted. Other mechanisms, such as the basicscheme, need to broadcast the list of all keys that are stored at the malicious node. Consequently, the revoked keys need to be re-established which adds another burden on the bandwidth and the sensor's power consumption.
EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
In order to evaluate our system, we carried out several experiments with respect to encryption/ decryption power consumption. The experiments also involved the AES, DES, and Triple DES with both regular and CBC mode. In the following analysis, we will consider the power unit as the power spent to run the sensor's CPU for 1 millisecond. The depicted results were obtained as the average of 50 runs, on the same benchmark. Table 1 clearly shows the power efficiency advantage of SDES compared to other symmetric key techniques. Moreover, when the CBC mode is deployed to protect against replay attacks, the peer symmetric key techniques waste more energy due to the extra XOR operation of the CBC mode. For instance, when AES-CBC is deployed for data encryption, it will still consume energy equivalent to 200% of that used by our mechanism. In addition, AES-CBC-MAC spends approximately another 200% more energy than SDES in order to protect against data integrity violations. Hence, the simplicity and the flexibility of our mechanism led to 75% saving of sensor's energy compared to AES-based techniques (e.g., TinySec), an achievement that makes our security system the most amenable for wireless sensor networks. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a novel security mechanism that is most amenable for deployment in the wireless sensor networks. The strength of our encryption technique, with a brute-force time complexity of 2 n , is stemmed from a simple permutation style.
From existing key distribution systems, we adopted the random key pre-distribution technique for its efficiency in terms of secret keys space usage. Moreover, we adopted the PKC method for authenticating newly joining sensors. However, we proposed two simple joining schemes that reduce the power consumption of PKC utilization.
Novel to our technique, the initial keys stored in the sensor's memory are re-keyed with every performed encryption/ decryption, which limits the effect of sensor's intrusion to only its communication links. Moreover, key revocation overhead is reduced to simply broadcasting the intruded node id instead of its captured set of keys.
We also introduced a new integrity mechanism that adapts to the hostility of the network environment. Instead of encountering a rigid overhead for data integrity, as done in peer mechanisms (e.g., CRC, CBC-MAC), we developed a flexible mechanism that saves bandwidth and reduces sensor energy consumption.
Simulation results show that our mechanism has a clear set of advantages over existing peer mechanisms. SDES possesses better power budget and balancing, and more immunity against sensor intrusion attacks.
